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ABSTRACT
This paper examines whether analysts resident in a country make more precise earnings forecasts
for firms in that country than analysts who are not resident in that country. Using a sample of 32
countries, we find that there is an economically and statistically significant analyst local advantage
even after controlling for firm and analyst characteristics. The importance of the local advantage is
inversely related to the quality of the information provided by firms. In particular, the local
advantage is high in countries where earnings are smoothed more, less information is disclosed by
firms, and firm idiosyncratic information explains a smaller fraction of stock returns. The local
advantage is also negatively related to market participation by foreign investors and by institutions
and positively related to holdings by insiders. U.S. investors underweight a country's stocks more














1.  Introduction 
 
Does distance reduce the quality of the information investors have? A large literature investigates the 
role of distance in investors’ portfolio decisions and investment performance. The largest segment of this 
literature focuses on investors who are separated by borders, but a growing segment investigates the role 
of distance within countries. Some of the literature concludes that local investors have an advantage. In 
the international finance literature, it is often believed that at least part of the home bias can be accounted 
for by the information advantage of local investors.
1 However, there are also papers that find that foreign 
investors who participate in a market can be better informed than local investors. In contrast to most 
studies which focus on investor choices and performance, in this paper we investigate directly whether 
distance affects the quality of information possessed by one group of market participants, analysts. It is 
known that in the U.S. analysts who are closer to the headquarters of a firm have an information 
advantage (Malloy, 2005). We find that local analysts have a significant information advantage over 
foreign analysts for a large sample of countries.  
We investigate the relation between the precision of earnings forecasts of local analysts and of foreign 
analysts for 32 countries for 2001 through 2003. Our main measure of accuracy for an analyst is the price-
scaled absolute forecast error of the analyst minus the average price-scaled absolute forecast error across 
analysts for the earnings forecasted. We define the local analyst advantage as the difference between the 
accuracy of local analysts and the accuracy of foreign analysts. If the local analysts have better 
information, they should predict earnings with more precision. We find that this is the case both for 
univariate comparisons and when we control for various determinants of forecast accuracy. The 
difference in the average forecast error in univariate comparisons between local and foreign analysts 
corresponds to 7.8 percent of the average price-scaled forecast error. When we control for various 
determinants of the forecast error, the local advantage falls slightly in most cases.   
                                                 
1 See Lewis (1999) and Karolyi and Stulz (2003) for reviews of the literature on the home bias.   3
Our dataset makes it possible to investigate whether the advantage of local analysts arises because 
they belong to local brokerage houses which might have established relationships with the local firms 
they follow or because local analysts are located close to the firms they follow. We consider separately 
local analysts belonging to local firms and local analysts belonging to foreign firms. We find that there is 
no difference between the two groups of analysts.  
There is considerable variation in the magnitude of the advantage of local analysts. Out of 32 
countries, the estimate of the advantage of local analysts is positive in 26 countries and significantly 
positive in 10 countries. We use this cross-country variation to investigate why local analysts have an 
advantage.  
A plausible explanation for the local advantage is that local analysts have access to information 
because they are on the spot. They can talk to firm representatives in person. They have access to 
information by observing what goes on in firms directly. For instance, if a firm is unusually busy, they 
might observe lots of trucks being loaded. Alternatively, they might talk to employees, customers, 
competitors. With this explanation, we would expect that the local advantage is inversely related to the 
quality of the information put forward by the firm. We find that this is strongly the case. Using the S&P 
Transparency and Disclosure index, we find a smaller analyst local advantage for firms that have an index 
value above the sample median. Similarly, the analyst local advantage is significantly lower in countries 
with above-median accounting transparency. There is no analyst local advantage in countries where 
earnings management is less prevalent. Further, the local advantage is significantly lower in countries 
where stock returns incorporate more idiosyncratic information. More precisely, the local advantage is 
strong in countries where the aggregate stock market return has much explanatory power for individual 
stock returns as measured by the R
2 measure of Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000). 
The local advantage is closely tied to the quality of disclosure. More disclosure levels the playing 
field for analysts. Generally, though, countries with low disclosure are also countries with weaker 
investor protection and poorer financial and economic development. We find that measures of financial 
development are not associated with the local advantage. One would think that local analysts would be   4
better, in that they would have more resources and better training, in countries with greater financial 
development. Foreign analysts typically belong to firms from developed countries, so that they might 
have an advantage in resources and training when competing with local analysts in countries with poor 
financial development. However, if disclosure in such countries is poor, the advantage local analysts 
obtain from poor disclosure seems to offset the disadvantage associated with poor financial development. 
Measures of investor rights unrelated to enforcement do not seem to affect the advantage of local 
analysts.  
Does the local advantage contribute to the home bias? Unfortunately, it is not straightforward to 
answer that question. As Healy and Palepu (2001) emphasize, there is both a demand and a supply for 
analyst services. Everything else equal, the demand from foreign investors will be less in countries where 
foreign ownership is smaller and where capital flows are lower. When the demand for analyst services 
from foreign investors is lower, we would expect fewer resources to be allocated to foreign analysts, so 
that the local advantage would be higher. Consequently, a non-information based home bias would lead to 
a local advantage. At the same time, however, information asymmetries that make local analysts better 
informed and foreign investors less well-informed can, at the same time, reduce the portfolio share of a 
country in the portfolio of foreign investors and increase the analyst local advantage. To disentangle these 
effects, we conduct a test that helps distinguish between an increase in the demand for analyst services 
and an information asymmetry effect and conclude that the information asymmetry is the more powerful 
effect, so that information asymmetry is a common cause for the analyst local advantage and the home 
bias.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the existing literature that addresses issues of 
distance. In Section 3, we introduce our sample. In Section 4, we present our analyst accuracy measures 
and univariate comparisons of forecasting accuracy. Section 5 establishes the existence of an advantage 
for local analysts controlling for firm and analyst characteristics. In Section 6, we investigate the 
determinants of the analyst local advantage. We turn to the relation between the analyst local advantage 
and the home bias in Section 7. Section 8 presents various robustness checks. We conclude in Section 9.   5
2.  Literature review  
It is well-known that the portfolios of investors are biased towards their home country. There is now a 
large literature that attempts to explain this home bias. An important strand of this literature emphasizes 
differences in information between domestic and foreign investors. Early papers that focus on differences 
in information between domestic and foreign investors include Gehrig (1993) and Kang and Stulz (1997). 
The assumption that foreign investors are less well-informed is taken as given by Brennan and Cao (1997) 
in a well-known article where they focus on the implications of this assumption for equity flows. A 
number of papers attempt to identify more directly whether foreign investors have an information 
disadvantage. The literature has mixed results. Hau (2001) investigates trading data for professional 
traders and shows that local investors perform better than foreign traders. Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005) 
and Dvorak (2005) find that foreigners trade at worse prices in Korea and Indonesia, respectively. 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) and Seasholes (2000) argue that better resources and better access to 
expertise allows foreign institutions to perform better than domestic institutions. Using daily data for the 
16 largest Finnish stocks, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) find that over a two-year period foreigners and 
domestic financial corporations buy more stocks that perform well over the next 120 trading days than 
domestic individual investors. Seasholes (2000) finds that foreign investors buy (sell) ahead of good (bad) 
earnings announcements in Taiwan while domestic investors do the opposite. Froot, O’Connell, and 
Seasholes (2001) and Froot and Ramadorai (2001) use flow data to show that foreign investors have some 
ability to predict returns. These papers are consistent with better information and greater sophistication on 
the part of foreign investors. However, evidence on the performance of foreign investors is mixed. For 
instance, Shukla and van Inwegen (1995) show that U.K. money managers underperform American 
money managers when picking U.S. stocks. Using 18 years of annual data, Kang and Stulz (1997) find no 
evidence that foreign investors outperform domestic investors in Japan.  
More recently, a new literature has developed which looks at the impact of distance on portfolio 
choice within countries. Coval and Moskowitz (1999), using only U.S. stock returns, provide evidence 
that investor location matters, in that mutual fund managers overweight the stocks of firms located closer   6
to them. In another paper, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that mutual fund managers are better at 
picking stocks of firms that are closer to where they are than stocks of firms from a more distant location. 
Huberman (2001) finds a local concentration in the ownership of the Baby Bells in the U.S. Ivković and 
Weisbrenner (2005) use data from a large discount brokerage house and find the striking result that one 
out of six U.S. individuals in their sample only invest in companies headquartered within 250 miles from 
the household. Recent papers show that social networks are important for stock holdings. For instance, 
Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) show that mutual fund managers are more likely to hold a particular stock 
if other managers in the same city are holding the same stock. 
A growing number of papers investigate the properties of analyst forecasts across countries. As 
documented by Chang, Khanna, and Palepu (2000) and others, there is considerable variation across 
countries in the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. These papers show that country characteristics affect the 
extent of analyst following and the properties of analyst forecasts. However, these papers seem to provide 
contradictory results on how the level of investor protection affects analyst accuracy. For instance, while 
Chang, Khanna, and Palepu (2000) find evidence that a country’s legal system helps understand the 
accuracy of analysts, Ang and Ciccone (2001) reach the opposite conclusion. Hope (2003) finds that the 
enforcement of accounting standards and firm-level disclosure are important determinants of forecast 
accuracy.  
Only a handful of papers investigate the relation between distance and analyst performance. Malloy 
(2005) finds evidence that, in U.S., analysts located closer to a firm are more accurate. Bacmann and 
Bolliger (2001) examine directly the relative performance of analysts from local and foreign brokerage 
houses for seven Latin American stock markets. They conclude that foreign analysts outperform local 
analysts. Their study has seven Latin American countries. When they compare the mean difference 
forecast error between local and foreign analysts, it is not significantly positive for their whole sample, 
but it is significantly positive for Mexico and Columbia. In contrast, Orpurt (2004) finds evidence of a 
significant local advantage for a sample of 7 European countries. In his study, local analysts are analysts 
resident in a country. Hence, these could be domestic or expatriate analysts. He finds that his results are   7
driven by Germany. However, while Bolliger (2004) focuses on local versus foreign brokerage houses 
and finds an advantage for local brokerage houses in Europe, Orpurt (2004) does not find this type of 
local advantage.  Conroy, Fukuda, and Harris (1997) also find a local brokerage house advantage in Japan. 
Finally, Chang (2003) compares specifically the forecasts of foreign and expatriate analysts for 
Taiwanese firms. He finds that there is a local advantage, in that expatriate analysts outperform foreign 
analysts, but then he also finds that expatriate analysts outperform local analysts working for domestic 
firms. This result is consistent with local analysts working for foreign institutions having the advantage of 
typically belonging to more sophisticated and resourceful organizations.   
 
3.  The sample.  
Our sample construction begins with the list of firms included in the S&P’s Transparency and 
Disclosure dataset (hereafter TD dataset). There are several advantages to using the list of firms included 
in the TD dataset. First, the dataset covers a large sample of firms from over 40 countries allowing us to 
examine the relation between country-level characteristics and the local analyst advantage. Second, the 
sample firms in the TD dataset are the largest and better known firms in each of the sample countries and 
attract much interest from international investors and analysts. Thus, to the extent that there is a bias in 
our sample construction, the bias leads us to understate the analyst local advantage, since this advantage is 
likely to be less severe for these firms. Finally, the TD dataset provides a comprehensive firm-level 
transparency and disclosure measure, which allows us to examine the impact of firm-level disclosure 
practices on the analyst local advantage.
2  The dataset provides objective rankings of the corporate 
reporting practices for firms included in the S&P Global 1200 index and an additional 400 companies in 
the Standard & Poor's/IFCI emerging markets index. S&P searches company annual reports and standard 
regulatory filings for the inclusion of the 98 most common disclosure items that fall into one of three 
categories: financial transparency and information disclosure (35 items), board and management structure 
                                                 
2 Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004), Khanna, Palepu, and Srinivasan (2004), and Durnev and Kim (2005) also use 
this data source for their measures of firm disclosure and corporate governance.   8
and process (35 items), and ownership structure and investor relations (28 items). The sample provided to 
us by Standard and Poor’s in September 2004 covers 894 non-U.S firms from 40 countries. 
For the list of firms included in the TD dataset, we obtain annual earnings per share forecasts as well 
as actual annual earnings per share from the I/B/E/S international files. I/B/E/S data includes Detail file, 
Identifier file, Actual file, and Broker Translation file. We then match each analyst’s name and brokerage 
name in I/B/E/S data with entries from Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research by hand.
3 Nelson’s 
Directory of Investment Research provides information including the analyst’s full name and the address, 
which allows us to tell whether the location of the company that the analyst covers is different from the 
location of the analyst.
4 Once we match each analyst’s name and brokerage name, we obtain the country 
location of the analyst and the corresponding country location of the firm that the analyst covers. If the 
country location of an analyst is the same as that of the firm he covers, we classify the analyst as a local 
analyst. Otherwise, we classify the analyst as a foreign analyst. Local analysts can be further classified 
into pure local analysts and expatriate analysts. A pure local analyst is an analyst working for a local 
research firm, while an expatriate analyst is an analyst working for a research firm from a foreign country. 
For the matched sample, we impose several restrictions. First, we select the countries where there are 
more than 50 firms followed by I/B/E/S analysts in the I/B/E/S dataset. This is to ensure that we select the 
countries that attract a reasonable amount of interest from analysts and international investors.
5  Second, 
we select the most recent earnings forecast for each analyst analyzing each firm in each year.  Finally, we 
select only the firms that are followed by both local and foreign analysts.
6 Without this restriction, we 
could pick up the effect of firm characteristics to the extent that local and foreign analysts follow firms 
with different characteristics. It is important to note that this restriction implies that, since we are studying 
                                                 
3 The major difficulty with the matching procedure is that, in some rare cases, we have duplicate matches that have 
exactly the same analyst and broker names. We exclude duplicate matches. However, the results are almost identical 
when we include these duplicate matches in the final sample. 
4 Each volume of Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research in year t compiles the data using analyst information 
as of November in year t-1. We classify an analyst’s location for year t using information in the Nelson’s Directory 
starting in November of year t through October of year t+1. 
5 We drop six countries: Colombia, Greece, Pakistan, Peru, Turkey, and Venezuela. 
6 The results without imposing these restrictions are similar. We provide the robustness tests in Table 9.   9
the local advantage only for firms which are also followed by foreign analysts, our analysis is likely to 
understate the extent of the local advantage across all firms since one would expect that foreign analysts 
would stay away from firms where the local advantage is highest. With this restriction, we lose 155 firms. 
Eight of these firms are only covered by foreign analysts and the rest are only covered by local analysts. 
Adding these firms to our main regression does not affect our conclusion as to the existence of analyst 
local advantage.  
Table 1 provides data on our sample. Our Standard & Poor’s TD scores to quantify firm-level 
information disclosure are based on information as of June 2002. While it seems reasonable to assume 
that data reported at that time might still describe firm disclosure policies for a few years before, it would 
be less reasonable to make this assumption going back further in the past. We therefore use 2001-2003 as 
our sample years. Our final sample contains 2,563 local and 1,920 foreign analysts providing a total of 
20,425 annual earnings forecasts on 611 firms from 32 countries. The table shows that, not surprisingly, 
there is considerable variation across countries in the number of firms in our sample. While the smallest 
number of firms is 2 for Austria, the largest is 118 for the U.K. The number of local and foreign analysts 
also varies substantially. While Austria has 3 local analysts, the U.K. has 690. The variation in the 
number of foreign analysts is also considerable, with South Africa having 11 foreign analysts and France 
having 526.  
The last column of Table 1 shows that the ratio of the number of foreign analysts to the number of 
distinct analysts varies sharply across countries as well. The lowest ratio is 0.12 for Japan and the highest 
is 0.91 for China. China has 67 foreign analysts in the sample, but only 7 local analysts. Only 10 countries 
have a ratio below 0.5. Consequently, in many of our sample countries there are more foreign analysts 
than local analysts.  
 
4.  Analyst precision: Univariate comparisons of local, expatriate, and foreign analysts 
Forecast accuracy is one of the most important dimensions along which financial analysts and their 
brokerage houses compete. The extant literature mainly uses four proxies for forecast accuracy and/or   10
forecast error. Unlike studies based on U.S samples, we do not use absolute forecast error as a dependent 
variable since our sample includes analyst forecasts made in a variety of currencies. The magnitude of 
absolute forecasts errors in small currency units (such as Italian lira) would be much higher than those 
using large currency units. Also, applying exchange rates to convert all of the forecasts into a single 
currency would introduce noise in our estimates due to exchange rate fluctuations. We use four accuracy 
variables and follow Clement and Tse (2005) and Malloy (2005) in constructing these variables. These 
variables are:  
 
Proportional Mean Absolute Forecast Error (pmafeijt): It is defined as the ratio of the difference 
between the absolute forecast error (AFEijt) by analyst i for firm j at time t and the mean absolute forecast 
error (avgAFEjT) of all of the forecasts for firm j for fiscal year T to the mean absolute forecast error 
avgAFEjT. From this, it follows that pmafeijt = (AFEijt-avgAFEjT)/avgAFEjT. A positive pmafeijt indicates 
that the absolute forecast error AFEijt by analyst i for firm j at time t is larger than the average absolute 
forecast error of all of the forecasts for firm j for the same fiscal year T.  
Proportional Mean Price-Scaled Absolute Forecast Error (pmafepijt): The definition is the same 
as the definition of pmafe, except that AFEijt is scaled by the latest monthly stock price available from 
Compustat and is denoted as AFEPijt.
7 Consequently, pmafepijt=(AFEPijt-avgAFEPjT)/avgAFEPjT.  
Demeaned Absolute Price-Scaled Forecast Error (dafepijt): To reduce heteroskedasticity we 
follow Clement (1999) to demean AFEPijt by the mean price-scaled absolute forecast error for firm i in 
the same fiscal year T, i.e., dafepijt=AFEPijt-avgAFEPjT.  
Range (rangeijt): The ratio of the difference between the highest AFEPijt for firm j,  fiscal year T 
(denoted  MaxAFEPjT) and the AFEPijt considered to the range of AFEPijt for firm j and fiscal year T, i.e., 
rangeijt =(MaxAFEPjT-AFEPijt)/ (MaxAFEPjT - MinAFEPjT).  
 
                                                 
7 We obtain similar result when use monthly stock prices from I/B/E/S summary files.   11
Since the first three dependent variables are forecast error proxies, we multiply each of them by 
minus one to transform them into forecast accuracy proxies. Consequently, an increase in our dependent 
variables means that the forecast becomes more precise.  Table 2 provides definitions of all the variables 
used in the paper. 
Table 3 provides mean and median values of the accuracy measures. We focus on the first row. The 
value of pmafep for pure local analysts is obtained as follows. The sample average absolute forecast error 
(avgAFEP) is 0.0232016. The average absolute forecast error for pure local analysts is 0.02267. The 
value of pmafep of 0.023 is equal to the difference in average absolute forecast error of pure local 
analysts and the sample average as a fraction of the sample average, (0.0232016 – 0.02267)/0.0232016. 
The difference in forecast accuracy between pure local and foreign analysts expressed as percentage of 
the sample average absolute forecast error is equal to 6.5% (corresponding to 0.023 – (-0.042) in the 
Table), while the difference in forecast accuracy between expatriate analysts and foreign analysts is 8.7%. 
Table 3 shows that, whether we use means or medians, there is never a significant difference in accuracy 
between pure local analysts and expatriates. For the first three accuracy measures, the pure local and the 
expatriate analysts are more accurate than foreign analysts. For the last accuracy measure, however, there 
is no significant difference between local analysts and foreign analysts whether we use means or medians.  
The results of Table 3 suggest that local analysts generally have an advantage over foreign analysts. 
One should be careful, however, in interpreting Table 3 because it does not control for forecast horizon 
and it is well-known that forecast horizon is an important determinant of accuracy (see, for instance, 
Clement, 1999). Further, stale forecasts could lead to large forecast errors that would not be instructive 
for our study. In the following, we eliminate the worst 1% forecast errors to ameliorate this problem. 
While none of our main conclusions is affected by this procedure, some subsidiary results are because our 
estimates are less precise when we include all observations.  
We also report data on the experience of analysts with a firm. We measure firm-specific experience 
as the number of years between the first forecast on the firm by the analyst and the forecast considered in 
the analysis. We find that local analysts have more firm-specific experience. On average, local analysts   12
have followed a firm almost half a year longer than foreign analysts. This is not surprising in an era of 
financial globalization, since we would expect more attention to be devoted to firms by foreigners over 
time. However, this raises the question of whether the local analyst advantage is simply due to a 
difference in experience. While local analysts are more experienced compared to foreign analysts for 
local firms, foreign analysts have as much experience as local analysts in the analyst profession. We 
compute the number of years from the first I/B/E/S forecast of an analyst (for any firm, whether in our 
sample or not) to the current forecast and find that there is no economically significant difference between 
domestic and foreign analysts. Finally, we measure the forecast horizon. It could be that local analysts 
have an advantage simply because the forecast we consider is closer to the earnings announcement date. 
We therefore measure the time period between the forecast and the earnings report date on I/B/E/S. We 
find that there is no significant difference in forecast horizon between local and foreign analysts. 
Information asymmetry varies with firm size. We report mean and median market capitalizations of 
the firms followed by the three groups of analysts. On average, local analysts do not follow larger or 
smaller firms, but their median firm size is significantly smaller. To the extent that one would expect 
forecast precision to increase with firm size (Ang and Ciccone, 2001, confirm this relation across 
countries), it follows that the firm size difference, if not controlled for, could lead to the spurious result 
that foreign analysts have an advantage over local analysts. Another reason that foreigners might have an 
advantage is that they come from much larger organizations. The median number of analysts for the 
brokerage firm of a pure local analyst is 37, while it is 124 for the brokerage firm of a foreign analyst. 
However, local analysts benefit from being more specialized. A typical local analyst follows one country, 
his own. In contrast, a typical foreign analyst follows firms in three countries. Foreign analysts also 
follow more industries than local analysts. However, foreign analysts are not at a complete disadvantage. 
They cover fewer firms than local analysts, but produce more forecasts per firm.  
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5.  Can the analyst local advantage be explained by analyst or firm characteristics? 
We saw in the previous section that local analysts differ from foreign analysts in a number of ways 
that are likely to affect the precision of their forecasts. Further, local analysts provide forecasts for smaller 
firms, which would affect their performance adversely compared to foreign analysts. To evaluate whether 
local analysts have an advantage, it is important to control for analyst and firm characteristics. After all, it 
could be that local analysts offer more precise forecasts because they are more specialized and not 
because they are local.  
In Table 4, we report estimates of multiple regressions. The regression t-statistics take into account 
the firm-level clustering. We also demean all our independent variables by the firm/year averages to 
reduce heteroskedasticity. In the first regression, we regress the accuracy measure, the proportional mean 
price-scaled absolute forecast error multiplied by -1, on the number of analysts from the analyst’s 
brokerage firm, on the forecast horizon, and on the number of industries the analyst covers. We expect 
precision to be higher if an analyst comes from a larger firm, to be lower if the forecast horizon is longer, 
and to be lower if he covers more industries. The only variable that is significant is the horizon. We find 
that a longer horizon reduces the accuracy substantially.  
In regression (2), we add a dummy variable for local analysts. This dummy variable is highly 
significant. In the next regression, we add variables for the firm-specific experience of the analyst and 
career experience. Consistent with Jacob et al. (1999), Hong et al. (2000), and Bolliger (2004), there is no 
general learning effect after we control for firm-specific experience. While analysts with more firm-
specific experience are more accurate, analysts with more career experience are less accurate. It could be 
that an analyst with more general experience covers more firms and devotes less resources to each firm he 
analyzes. Controlling for these analyst characteristics does not affect our estimate of the local analyst 
advantage. Note that our independent variables are demeaned by firm/year averages. Thus, when fixing 
independent variables other than the local dummy at their mean values (which are zeros), the predicted 
value of forecast accuracy increases from 0.017 (intercept) for foreign investors to 0.060 (intercept plus 
the local dummy estimate) for local investors. Even when we control for various determinants of forecast   14
accuracy, the average forecast accuracy of local analysts therefore exceeds the average forecast accuracy 
of foreign analysts by 5.3% of the average absolute forecast error. Finally, in regression (4) we consider 
separately the advantage of pure local analysts and expatriate analysts. There is no difference in the 
estimate of the advantage for these two types of analysts. Consequently, in the following we focus only 
on local analysts and do not make a distinction between pure local and expatriate analysts. 
In Table 5, we estimate regression (4) of Table 4 on subsamples. First, we split the sample between 
forecasts made after the fiscal year end and those made before. This is an important distinction in that 
access to insiders would make the largest difference in precision for forecasts made after the fiscal year 
end. After the fiscal year end, insiders will have a very good sense of how the numbers will look like. If 
they tip off their favorite analysts, these analysts should have a substantial advantage in precision. We 
find that there is a local advantage for both subsamples. However, the point estimate of the local 
advantage is higher (but not significantly so) for forecasts made after the year end. Table 5 also 
distinguishes between forecasts made in separate years. We find that the local advantage is significant in 
2001 at the 5% level and in 2003 at the 10% level, but only marginally so in 2002 (the p-value is 0.103).   
The second panel of Table 5 reports estimates of the local advantage per country. There is substantial 
variation in the number of observations across countries, so that it is not surprising that the precision of 
the estimates varies across countries. Nevertheless, the estimate for the local advantage is positive in all 
countries but six. There is no country where the local advantage is significantly negative, but the local 
advantage is significantly positive in ten countries at the 10% level or better. We discussed in the 
introduction the work of Bacman and Bolliger (2001). They have two countries where the local advantage 
(using our language) is significantly negative, Mexico and Columbia. Only Mexico is in our sample. 
Strikingly, Mexico is the country in our sample where the local advantage is the lowest – it is negative 
with a t-statistic of -1.58. It follows that their results are similar to those of our paper. 
We have established that the local advantage is robust to controlling for various analyst characteristic 
variables. We now investigate whether the size of the analyst local advantage depends on the information 
environment of the firm. In other words, are local analysts better for firms where information   15
asymmetries are greater? If this were the case, then an important component of the local advantage would 
be the ability of local analysts to obtain information that is not readily available to analysts outside the 
country.  
We use three different proxies for the firm’s information environment. The first regression in Table 6 
uses the Transparency and Disclosure score (TD score) of firms as a measure of the information 
environment. Firms with a higher score release more information. We would therefore expect the local 
advantage to fall with the TD score. We construct a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the TD score of 
the firm is above the median score of our sample firms and then create an interaction variable with the 
dummy for local analysts.  A significant negative coefficient on the interaction dummy means that an 
increase in the transparency level is associated with a lower local advantage. We find that the 
transparency itself does not affect the precision of forecasts. However, it does affect the local advantage 
significantly. The local advantage of the more transparent firms is lower by 0.038 than the local 
advantage of the other firms, so that the local analyst advantage roughly drops in half when one moves 
from a less transparent firm to a more transparent firm. In the next regression, we use a dummy variable 
for firms with market capitalization above the median market capitalization in our sample. Though 
analyst precision is higher for larger firms, firm size does not affect the local advantage at all.  
The last regression in Table 6 contrasts the local advantage for purely domestic firms and for firms 
which are cross-listed in the U.S. Firms cross-listed in the U.S. have a more transparent information 
environment.
8 They are also subject to many U.S. laws and regulations that protect investors.
9 Lang, Lins, 
and Miller (2003) document that cross-listings are associated with an increase in analyst forecast 
precision. We confirm their result in our sample. In addition, however, we find that a cross-listing sharply 
reduces the local advantage. The local advantage of a purely domestic firm is 0.062, but that advantage 
drops to 0.026 for firms that are cross-listed in the U.S. Nevertheless, the local advantage is still 
significant for cross-listed firms.  
                                                 
8 Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva (2005) investigate the impact of cross-listings on the informational environment of 
firms. 
9 See Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004).   16
6.  Do country characteristics help explain the analyst local advantage?  
There is a robust local advantage. This advantage is strongly related to the firms’ information 
environment. The information environment differs across countries. One would therefore expect the local 
advantage to differ across countries. There are other reasons for the information advantage to differ across 
countries, however. In Table 7, we explore the relation between the local advantage and a large number of 
country characteristics which we would expect a priori to influence the local advantage. All the 
regressions in that Table have the control variables from Table 5, but we do not report the estimates for 
the coefficients on these variables. We focus on the interaction of the local analyst dummy variable with 
the country characteristic we are interested in. A significant positive coefficient on the interaction means 
that an increase in the country characteristics is associated with a higher local advantage. In all 
regressions, we construct a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the value of the country 
characteristic variable (other than binary variables) is above the median value of our sample countries and 
then interact that variable with the local analyst dummy. 
In the first regression, we investigate the language barrier. Foreign analysts are likely to be fluent in 
English. We would expect them to be more at a disadvantage for firms in countries where English is not 
the main language. We use the CIA World Factbook to identify countries where English is the official 
language. The local advantage is weaker in countries where English is the official language. While the 
coefficient on the interacted variable is negative, it is insignificant. 
We then turn to measures of economic and financial development. The first measure is GDP per 
capita. It plays no role in the local advantage. Next, we divide the countries into developed and 
developing countries. There is no evidence that the local advantage differs between the two types of 
countries. The development of the equity market does not affect the local advantage significantly. We 
would expect financial markets to be less developed if state ownership in the financial sector is more 
important. We use a dummy variable that takes value 1 if state ownership of banks in a country is higher 
than for the median, using the data from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2003). The interaction has a positive 
sign, but it is only marginally significant. Finally, we use a measure of openness of the financial sector.   17
From the same data source, we construct a variable that takes value equal to 1 if foreign ownership of 
banks exceeds the median. Again, this variable does not help explain the local advantage. While none of 
our economic and financial development variables are statistically significant, some of the coefficients 
imply that greater economic and financial development might be associated with an economically 
significant reduction in the local advantage.  
Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2003) point out portfolio investors can only hold the 
shares not held by corporate insiders. Consequently, foreign investors have a lower demand for analyst 
services for stocks in countries where insiders have a larger proportional stake.  We use next a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 if the average ownership of the three largest shareholders for the 10 largest 
non-financial domestic private firms in a country is above the median of the sample countries using the 
data from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998). The interaction with this dummy variable is 
significant and has a positive coefficient as expected. 
The supply of analyst services should increase with the importance of institutional investors in an 
economy since these services are primarily directed towards institutional investors. We find that the 
precision of analyst forecasts is significantly higher in countries where assets in so-called pooled 
investment schemes to GDP (as measured by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (1999)) exceed the 
median in our sample. At the same time, the local advantage is significantly lower in these countries.  
Regressions (9) through (14) control for proxies for investor rights, respect for property rights, and 
enforcement. There is no clear prediction for whether protection of investor rights and of property rights 
increases the local advantage or reduces it. While poor investor protection is expected to increase the 
local advantage through several channels, there are also channels through which it could reduce it. With 
poor protection of property rights, transparency and good governance can be costly for firms (see Stulz, 
2005). One would expect local analysts to have an advantage when firms are less transparent. Further, 
poor protection of property rights affects foreign investors typically more because they are often easier to 
expropriate, so that their holdings are smaller. With poor investor protection, an important determinant of 
reported earnings is the extent to which insiders can affect reported earnings adversely by expropriating   18
minority shareholders and other investors. One would expect local analysts to have an advantage in 
ferreting out tunneling by being on the spot. However, at the same time, it is also possible that local 
analysts are less independent than foreign analysts in countries where protection of investor rights is 
weak, in which case foreign analysts might provide more accurate forecasts than local analysts.  
Our first proxy for investor protection is the legal origin variable from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV, 1998). Using a dummy variable that takes value 0 for common law countries 
and 1 for other countries, we find that there is no relation between legal origin and the local advantage in 
that the interaction between the local dummy and the legal origin dummy is insignificant. The next 
regression uses the anti-director index of LLSV. The coefficient on the interaction is not significant and 
its economic significance is trivial. In regression (11), we use a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the 
index of the respect for property rights from LLSV is above the median in our sample. Again, the 
interaction is not significant. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2005) use an index of public 
enforcement. We construct a dummy variable that gives a value of 1 to the countries that have an above-
median value of this index. The interaction with that dummy variable is not significant. It is worth noting, 
however, that the economic significance of the interactions with the property and public enforcement 
dummy variables is substantial since the interaction seems to cut the local advantage in half. The final 
proxy for investor rights is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if class actions are available in a 
prospectus liability case. We use the data from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2005). The 
interaction is significant and negative. The magnitude of the estimate on the interaction term is also 
economically large enough to cut the local advantage by more than 70%. Regression (14) uses the 
measure of enforcement of insider trading laws of Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2005). We find that the 
enforcement of insider trading laws is not related to analyst precision or to the analyst local advantage. 
 We then turn to variables that measure the quality and extent of disclosures. We expect local analysts 
to have more of an advantage in countries where the quality and extent of disclosures are poorer because 
they benefit more from informal sources of information acquisition. Our first measure of the quality of 
disclosures is a proxy for earnings management. This proxy is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the index of   19
earnings management of a country from Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) is above the median of the 
countries in our sample. We find that the local advantage is sharply higher in countries with more 
earnings management. The local advantage is not significant in countries with below-median earnings 
management. We use next a dummy variable equal to 1 if a country’s index of financial disclosures from 
the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) is above the median for our 
sample. We use the data from Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2005). We find that the local advantage is 
significantly weaker in countries with higher disclosure according to that index. Note also that analysts 
forecasts are generally more (less) accurate in countries with a higher (lower) disclosure level. 
Finally, we use a measure of functional efficiency of the capital markets, the R
2
 measure introduced 
by Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000). This measure is the average R
2 of market model regressions for a 
country. If the market return explains much of the return of individual securities, it means that 
idiosyncratic information about firms does not get incorporated into stocks well – or, alternatively, that 
idiosyncratic information is not important. A high R
2 means that country specific information is more 
important for stock returns. Residents may have more information about these factors. For instance, 
Kaufmann, Mehrez, and Schmukler (2003) find that local managers have useful information in predicting 
future movements in exchange rates. We find that the local advantage is significantly higher in countries 
with a high R
2 and analyst forecasts are less accurate in these countries.  
The results in Table 7 show that the local advantage is less in countries where firms disclose more, 
manipulate earnings less, the stock market is more functionally efficient, and institutional investors are 
more active. However, measures of financial development and measures of investor protection do not 
seem to have a significant association with the size of the local advantage. 
 
7.  Foreign investors and the local analyst advantage 
It would make little sense for foreign analysts to follow firms in a country if foreign investors cannot 
invest in these firms. One would therefore expect greater supply of analyst services by foreign firms when 
foreign investors are more interested in a country and hold more equity from that country. If analysts   20
become more accurate when the demand for their services increases, perhaps because they command 
more resources, we would expect the local advantage to fall as the portfolio share of foreign investors in a 
country increases. At the same time, however, if information asymmetry between local and foreign 
investors is a determinant of the home bias, we would expect it to increase the analyst local advantage as 
well. In this case, the information asymmetry would contribute both to the home bias and to the analyst 
local advantage.  
We use four proxies for foreign interest using data for U.S. investors. The first two proxies use data 
for both equity and debt, while the other two use only equity data. The first variable is a dummy variable 
that takes value 1 if U.S. holdings of equity and debt scaled by local market GDP are above the median of 
the countries in our sample. We use the TIC data from the U.S. Treasury. We find that this variable is 
extremely significant, as shown in regression (1) of Table 8. Essentially, there is little local advantage left 
for countries where the dummy variable takes a value of 1. Interestingly, analyst forecasts in general are 
more precise in countries with greater holdings by U.S. investors. This could be evidence that markets in 
which U.S. investors invest more are more functionally efficient. We also construct a dummy variable 
that takes value 1 if equity and debt flows scaled by GDP are above the median for a country. Again, the 
local advantage is significantly lower for countries where this dummy variable takes value 1 (regression 
(2) of Table 8). It follows that there is strong evidence that the analyst local advantage is strongest in 
countries that draw the least interest from U.S. investors.  
We now turn to the two proxies that use equity data. The first proxy, used in regression (3), is the 
fraction of the equity market capitalization of a country held by U.S. investors. We find that the accuracy 
of analyst forecasts generally increases as U.S. investors have a greater presence in a market. Further, the 
analyst local advantage is negatively related to the presence of U.S. investors in the market. The second 
proxy, used in regression (4), is the share of a country’s equities in the portfolio of U.S. investors. We 
find that the accuracy of analysts is not related to that proxy, but the analyst local advantage falls as a 
country’s shares become more important in the portfolio of U.S. investors.   21
A possible issue with our results is that U.S. investors might invest more in more transparent firms 
since there is some evidence in the literature that US investors invest more in better governed firms (see, 
for instance, Leuz, Lins, and Warnock, 2005).  In this case, controlling directly for governance proxies 
would eliminate the effect we uncover. In unreported tests, we include interaction variables with both U.S. 
holdings and firm-level transparency variable (TD scores) in the explanatory variables. We find that the 
relation between U.S. holdings and the local advantage is robust to allowing for a relation between the TD 
score and the local advantage.   
So far, we have shown that the greater the U.S. investor participation in a country, the lower the 
analyst local advantage. To try to understand better whether the analyst local advantage causes the home 
bias or vice versa, we use the following identification strategy. If the home bias causes the analyst local 
advantage, then any increase in the investments of U.S. investors in a country should be associated with a 
lower analyst local advantage irrespective of why this increase takes place. We can therefore decompose 
the ownership of shares of U.S. investors in a country into two components, one which is related to the 
home bias and one which is not. Absent the home bias, U.S. investors would hold the world market float 
portfolio.
10 The portfolio they hold is the world market float portfolio minus the home bias component, 
which we define as the difference between a country’s share in the world market float portfolio and the 
country’s share in the portfolio of U.S. investors (the DIFF variable in the regression). Keeping the home 
bias component constant, an increase in a country’s share in the world market portfolio (the WORLD 
RATIO variable) increases the demand for analyst services by foreign investors and hence should 
decrease the analyst local advantage if the causation running from the U.S. investor holdings to analyst 
local advantage is important. Regression (5) shows a regression where the interaction variable is a 
country’s share in the world market float portfolio. We find that neither analyst precision nor the analyst 
local advantage is related to that variable.  Regression (6) uses the DIFF variable as the interaction 
variable instead. In this case, the analyst precision is negatively related to DIFF. Further, the analyst local 
advantage is significantly higher when DIFF is higher (that is, when the home bias is higher). If the 
                                                 
10 See Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2003).    22
analyst local advantage is driven by the demand for analyst services by foreign investors, we should find 
that DIFF and WORLD RATIO have identical coefficients. This is not the case. To investigate this 
directly, we estimate a regression where we include both the WORLD RATIO and DIFF. Strikingly, the 
coefficient on DIFF is much larger in absolute value than the coefficient on WORLD RATIO in the 
interactions. Equality of the absolute values of the coefficients is rejected with a p-value of 0.0064. 
Further, only the interaction with DIFF is significant. All of these results are consistent with causation 
from information asymmetry between local and foreign residents to the home bias and the analyst local 
advantage, but not with causation from the home bias to the analyst local advantage.   
Our interpretation of the results implies that holdings by U.S. investors in a country should be 
negatively related to the size of the analyst local advantage. We find that this is the case. When we regress 
the portfolio share of a country for U.S. investors on the country’s share in the world float market 
portfolio in 2002 and on our estimates of the analyst local advantage estimated for each country in Table 
5, we obtain the following results (p-values in parentheses): 
 
U.S. portfolio share =  0.333 + 0.967*World float market portfolio share – 2.240*Analyst local advantage 
        (0.287) (0.000)                    (0.074) 
 
The adjusted R-square of the regression is 0.935. The coefficient on analyst local advantage is significant 
and negative as expected. We also estimated the regression omitting the U.K. and Japan. Our conclusions 
are unchanged.  
 
8.  Robustness tests 
We now investigate further the extent to which our estimate of the local advantage is reliable. As 
discussed in Section 3, we have four measures of accuracy. Except in Table 3, we used only one of these 
measures. Table 9 estimates regression (3) of Table 4 for each of the three accuracy measures we 
estimated but have not used so far in our regressions. Because the scale of the measures differs, we would   23
expect the local advantage estimate to depend on the accuracy measure used. However, we see that the 
local advantage is significant irrespective of the measure we use.  
As explained in Section 3, we restrict our analysis to firms that are followed by both local and foreign 
analysts. To evaluate how our estimate of the local advantage is affected by that restriction, we extend our 
sample to include firms that are followed by only one type of analysts. Again, the significance of our 
result is not affected. The regressions reported so far use the latest forecast of each analyst. Regression (5) 
extends the sample to include all analyst forecasts during our sample period. We see that the local 
advantage remains significant when we add these additional forecasts.  
Finally, in regression (6), we add additional control variables that might be related to accuracy. We 
include counts for the number of forecasts made, the number of firms covered, and the number of 
countries covered by each analyst. Adding these variables does not affect our results and does not add to 
the explanatory power of our regressions.  
 
9.  Conclusion  
In this paper, we show that there is a significant analyst local advantage in a sample of 32 countries. 
This analyst local advantage holds when we control for analyst characteristics as well as firm 
characteristics. However, it varies substantially across countries. The analyst local advantage is strong in 
countries where disclosures are weaker, where institutional investors are less important, and where 
corporate ownership is more concentrated. It is also strong in countries that are underweighted in U.S. 
portfolios, so that the underlying information asymmetries that lead to the analyst local advantage also 
contribute to the home bias.     24
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Table 1 Distribution of sample firms and analysts by country and analyst group 
The table shows the number of firms, pure local, expatriate, and foreign analysts in each country. The sample firms are the intersection of I/B/E/S for non-U.S. 
firms, Nelson’s Directories of Investment Research, and Standard and Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure. The final sample contains 1,020 pure local, 1,563 
expatriate, and 1,920 foreign analysts covering 611 firms from 32 countries over the period of 2001 to 2003. Local analysts are analysts located in the same 
country as their covered firms, while foreign analysts are located in a different country from the firms they cover. Local analysts are furthered classified into pure 
local and expatriate analysts. Pure local analysts work for local research firms, while expatriate analysts work for research firms from foreign countries. The 
number of analysts across countries does not add up to the total number since an analyst (particularly a foreign analyst) can analyze several firms in different 
countries. Similarly, the number of local and foreign analysts does not add up to the total number of distinct analysts since an analyst can switch her brokerage 
firm across borders. 
 
Number of analysts 
Local analysts (B)  Country  No. of firms 
Foreign (A) 
Pure local  Expatriate 
Total number of 
distinct analyst (C) 
A / C 
Argentina  7  25 2 2  29  0.86 
Australia  16 27 20 77  123  0.22 
Austria  2  24 2 1  27  0.89 
Belgium  6 70 13  9 92  0.76 
Brazil  23 85 16 27  126  0.66 
Chile  7  25 1 3  29  0.86 
China  9  67 0 7  74  0.91 
Denmark  6 99  7 26  132  0.75 
Finland  4 80 10 10  100  0.80 
France  47 526 153 130 806  0.65 
Germany  31  454 94 64  611  0.74 
Hong  Kong  17 26 37  141  202  0.13 
India  17 25 10 53 86  0.29 
Indonesia  11 23  0 19 42  0.55 
Ireland  3  43 8 1  51  0.84 
Italy  26  250 32 56  335  0.75 
Japan  61 18 25  108  146  0.12 
Korea  13 13  7 27 47  0.28   28
Malaysia  23 63 27 53  140  0.45 
Mexico  14 72  7 11 90  0.80 
Netherlands  23  405 69 32  503  0.80 
Norway  4 32  5 23 60  0.53 
Philippines  8 34  0 26 60  0.57 
Portugal  7 87 16  2  105  0.83 
Singapore 9 40 28 55  123  0.33 
South  Africa  3 11  1 16 28  0.39 
Spain  17 208  8  56 271  0.77 
Sweden  18  217 47 39  298  0.73 
Switzerland  17  300 61 11  372  0.81 
Taiwan  25 48  4 62  113  0.42 
Thailand 19 41  5 33 77  0.53 
The  U.K.  118 291 305 385 950  0.30 
        
Total  611 1,920 1,020 1,563 3,482     29
Table 2 Description of variables 
The table describes the variable definitions. 
 
 




Proportional Mean Absolute Forecast Error is defined as the ratio of difference between the absolute forecast error (AFEijt) by analyst i for 
firm j at time t and the mean absolute forecast error (avgAFEjT) of all of the forecasts for firm j for fiscal year T, to the mean absolute 
forecast error avgAFEjT, i.e. pmafeijt=(AFEijt-avgAFEjT)/avgAFEjT. A positive pmafeijt indicates that the absolute forecast error AFEijt by 
analyst i for firm j at time t is larger than the average absolute forecast error of all of the forecasts for the firm j for the same fiscal year T. 




Proportional Mean Price-scaled Absolute Forecast Error is defined similarly as pmafe, except that AFEijt is scaled by the latest available 
monthly stock price from Compustat, i.e. pmafepijt=(AFEPijt-avgAFEPjT)/avgAFEPjT. To facilitate interpretation we multiply this variable 




Demeaned Absolute Forecast Errors scaled by the most recent stock prices in the previous fiscal year. The price-scaled absolute forecast 
error AFEPijt of analyst i for firm j at time t is computed as the price-scaled absolute difference between an earnings forecast and the 
actually disclosed earnings. To reduce heteroskedasticity we follow Clement (1999) to demean AFEPijt by the mean price-scaled absolute 




rangeijt is the ratio of the difference between the maximum afepijt for firm j, fiscal year T and a particular afepijt, to the range of afepijt for 
firm j and fiscal year T. 
 
 








Dummy variable that equals 1 if analyst i is located in the same country as the covered firm j at time t and work for local research firms, 
and 0 otherwise.  
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expatriateijt 
 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if analyst i is located in the same country as the covered firm j at time t and work for research firms from 









Analyst firm specific experience, defined as the time interval in years between analyst i’s first forecast for a particular firm j and his 




Analyst general experience, defined as the time interval in years between analyst i’s first forecast in the I/B/E/S database and his current 
forecast at time t.  
 
mvjy  Market capitalization in US million dollars for firm j in year Y. 
mvdumjY-1 
 
Dummy variable indicating firm size. It is 1 if the market value of firm j is above the median market value of all of the firms from the same 
























Transparency dummy equal to 1 if the overall score in Standard & Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure dataset for firm j is above the 
median score for all of the covered firms in the final sample, and 0 otherwise. 
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adrjt 
 
Dummy variable indicating whether firm j has an ADR program in place at time t. The ADR information is from the website of the Bank 
of New York. 
 
 




Dummy variable equal to 1 if English is an official language for the domicile country of the covered firm, and 0 otherwise. The original 
source is from the CIA World Factbook and the website of http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm  
 
GDP per capitai 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the GDP of a country is above the median of the countries in the final sample, and 0 otherwise. The data is 








Dummy variable equal to 1 if the index of the equity market importance is above the median of the countries in the final sample, and 0 




Dummy variable equal to 1 if the state ownership of banking for country i is above the median of the countries in the final sample, and 0 
otherwise. The data are from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2003). 
 
foreign bank  
ownershipi 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the foreign ownership of banking for country i is above the median of the countries in the final sample, and 0 





Dummy variable equal to 1 if the average ownership of three largest shareholders for the 10 largest non-financial domestic private firms in 
country i is above the median of the countries in the final sample, and 0 otherwise. The data are from La Porta et al. (1998). 
pooled investmenti 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the average of total assets of pooled investment schemes to GDP between 1993 and 1995 for country i is 




Dummy variable equal to 0 if the legal origin of country i is common law, and 1 otherwise. The raw data are from La Porta et al. (1998). 
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antidirector rightsi 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if anti-director index for country i is above the median of the countries in the final sample. The raw anti-




Dummy variable equal to 1 if the property rights index for country i is above the median of the countries in the final sample, and 0 




Dummy variable equal to 1 if the index of public enforcement for country i is above the median of the countries in the final sample, and 0 
otherwise. The index equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Supervisor characteristics index; (2) Investigative powers index; (3) Orders index; 




Dummy variable equal to 1 if class action suits are available in a prospectus liability case. The data are from La Porta et al. (2005). 
 
insider trading  
enforcementj 
 
Dummy variable indicating whether a covered firm j is from a country with insider trading law enforcement according to the data source 





Dummy variable equal to 1 if the index of earnings management for country i is above the median of the countries in the final sample, and 




Dummy variable equal to 1 if the index of financial disclosure for country i is above the median of the countries in the final sample, and 0 





Dummy variable equal to 1 if the average of the R2s estimated from the market model for country i is above the median of the countries in 




Dummy variable equal to 1 if US investors’ overseas holding of equity and debt scaled by local market GDP is above the median of the 




Dummy variable equal to 1 if the US investors’ overseas equity and debt flow scaled by local market GDP is above the median of the 
countries in the final sample, and 0 otherwise. The data are from the US Treasury Department. 
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US equityi 
 












The difference between a country’s share in the world market portfolio and the country’s share in the portfolio of U.S. investors. 
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Table 3 Summary statistics by analysts groups 
The table shows summary statistics of main variables used in the analysis. The sample firms are the intersection of I/B/E/S for non-U.S. firms, Nelson’s 
Directories of Investment Research, and Standard and Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure. The final sample contains 1,020 pure local, 1,563 expatriate, and 
1,920 foreign analysts covering 611 firms from 32 countries over the period of 2001 to 2003. Local analysts are analysts located in the same country as the firms 
they cover, while foreign analysts are located in a different country from the firms they cover. Local analysts are furthered classified into pure local and 
expatriate analysts. Pure local analysts work for local research firms, while expatriate analysts work for research firms from foreign countries. The summary 
statistics of forecast-related variables are computed by partitioning each earning forecast (and its related variables) into one of the three different groups 
depending on the analyst identity. The summary statistics of analyst-related variables are computed as follows. The average value of analyst-related variable is 
computed for each analyst in each of the three different analyst groups. The mean and median are then computed across analysts for each analyst group. To 
facilitate interpretation, we multiply the forecast variables by minus one, so that higher values of dependent variable imply more accurate forecasts. All variables 
are as defined in Table 2. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values.  
 
Pure local (A)  Expatriate (B)  Foreign (C)  A-B  B-C  A-C 
Variable 















Panel A: Forecast-related variables 
pmafep  0.023 0.168 0.045 0.156 -0.042 0.153 (0.16) (0.91) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
pmafe  0.024 0.141 0.049 0.155 -0.045 0.146 (0.10) (0.64) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
dafep  0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 (0.68) (0.22) (0.01) (0.36) (0.01) (0.04) 
range  0.638 0.736 0.634 0.728 0.639 0.735 (0.51) (0.56) (0.31) (0.95) (0.84) (0.52) 
firmexp  2.077 1.315 1.968 1.422 1.595 1.005 (0.01) (0.80) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
genexp  3.386 2.704 3.288 2.753 3.648 2.778 (0.06) (0.47) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
horizon  0.406 0.321 0.408 0.321 0.411 0.321 (0.77) (0.50) (0.50) (0.20) (0.36) (0.66) 
No. of obs.  4,412  6,536  9,477                 35
 
Pure local (A)  Expatriate (B)  Foreign (C)  A-B  B-C  A-C 
Variable 















Panel B: Analyst-related variables 
mv  17,723 8,681  16,082 7,145  18,243 9,993 (0.15) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.57) (0.05) 
brsize  90.439  37.857  133.795  109.000  137.234  124.000 (0.00) (0.00) (0.32) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) 
ind  4.028 3.000 4.022 3.000 4.377 3.750 (0.96) (0.48) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
nctry  2.020 1.000 2.241 1.683 3.225 3.000 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ntik  9.784 8.250 8.995 8.000 8.375 7.528 (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
nfcst  20.913  18.000  24.541  21.688  22.823  19.000 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
No. of obs.  1,020  1,563  1,920               
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Table 4 Forecast accuracy and local analyst advantage 
This table presents ordinary least squares regression results of forecast accuracy on local analyst dummy and 
analyst, forecast and firm characteristics. The dependent variable (Pmafep) is computed as Pmafepijt=(AFEPijt- 
avgAFEPjT)/avgAFEPjT where AFEPijt is the absolute forecast error by analyst i for firm j at time t scaled by the 
latest available monthly stock price and avgAFEPjT is the mean absolute forecast error of all of the forecasts for firm 
j for fiscal year T. To facilitate interpretation, we multiply this variable by minus one, so that higher values of the 
dependent variable imply more accurate forecasts. All variables are as defined in Table 2. Independent variables are 
demeaned by the firm/year averages to reduce heteroskedasticity. T-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in 
parentheses. 
 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dummy for  
local analysts    0.046 
(4.31) 
0.043 
(3.98)   
Dummy for 
pure local analysts       0.045 
(3.00) 
Dummy for  
Expatriate analysts       0.041 
(3.46) 











































No. of obs.  20,221  20,221  20,221  20,221 
Adjusted R
2  0.041 0.042 0.043 0.043 
 
Test: pure local=expatriate 
F-statistic      0.08 
(p-value)      0.78   37
Table 5 Forecast accuracy for subsamples partitioned by forecast horizon, fiscal year, and country 
This table presents ordinary least squares regression results of forecast accuracy on local analyst dummy and 
analyst, forecast and firm characteristics for the subsamples partitioned by forecast horizon, by year, and by country. 
Horizon zero refers to forecasts provided within 180 days after the fiscal year end but at least 5 days before the 
reporting dates of actual earnings according to I/B/E/S. Horizon one refers to forecasts provided within one year 
before the fiscal year end. The dependent variable (Pmafep) is computed as Pmafepijt=(AFEPijt-
avgAFEPjT)/avgAFEPjT where AFEPijt is the absolute forecast error by analyst i for firm j at time t scaled by the 
latest available monthly stock price and avgAFEPjT is the mean absolute forecast error of all of the forecasts for firm 
j for fiscal year T. To facilitate interpretation, we multiply this variable by minus one, so that higher values of the 
dependent variable imply more accurate forecasts. All variables are as defined in Table 2. Independent variables are 
demeaned by the firm/year averages to reduce heteroskedasticity. T-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in 
parentheses. 
 
Horizon  Year 
Variables 
0  1 2001 2002 2003 












































































No. of obs  4,528  15,693  6,598  6,507  7,116 
Adjusted R
2 0.006  0.055  0.074  0.033  0.026 
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By country 
Country  Coef. for local  t-statistic  No. of obs  Adjusted R
2 
Argentina 0.663  2.17  48  0.157 
Australia -0.088  -0.73  265  0.060 
Austria -0.325  -0.67  44  0.093 
Belgium 0.323  2.62  201  0.097 
Brazil 0.067  0.89  471  0.064 
Chile 0.046  0.20  52  0.250 
China 0.347  1.90  208  0.073 
Denmark 0.382  2.49  244  0.036 
Finland -0.081  -0.53  184  0.033 
France 0.017  0.51  2,569  0.029 
Germany 0.088  1.98  1,794  0.050 
Hong Kong  -0.016  -0.18  558  0.134 
India 0.308  3.41  287  0.080 
Indonesia 0.355  2.96  159  0.190 
Ireland 0.106  0.48  152  0.027 
Italy 0.066  1.38  1,091  0.040 
Japan 0.199  3.04  834  0.148 
Korea 0.240  1.86  103  0.275 
Malaysia 0.029  0.47  614  0.164 
Mexico -0.159  -1.58  267  0.051 
Netherlands 0.011  0.22  1,335  0.064 
Norway -0.309  -1.31  103  0.110 
Philippines 0.124  0.86  131  0.118 
Portugal 0.126  0.75  187  0.078 
Singapore 0.170  1.83  316  0.099 
South Africa  0.307  1.57  59  0.100 
Spain 0.045  0.73  773  0.037 
Sweden 0.076  1.17  857  0.037 
Switzerland 0.079  1.17  952  0.057 
Taiwan 0.063  0.85  480  0.320 
Thailand 0.032  0.38  362  0.203 
The U.K.  0.014  0.53  4,521  0.013   39
Table 6 Local analyst advantage and firm-level corporate governance 
This table presents ordinary least squares regression results of forecast accuracy on local analyst dummy, analyst, 
firm and forecast characteristics, and governance variables. Three proxies for firm-level governance are used: S&P’s 
Transparency and Disclosure Score (tdscore), dummy for large firm (mvdum), and dummy for a firm with ADR 
program. Dependent variable (Pmafep) is computed Pmafepijt=(AFEPijt-avgAFEPjT)/avgAFEPjT where AFEPijt is the 
absolute forecast error by analyst i for firm j at time t scaled by the latest available monthly stock price and 
avgAFEPjT is the mean absolute forecast error of all of the forecasts for firm j for fiscal year T. To facilitate 
interpretation, we multiply this variable by minus one, so that higher values of dependent variable imply more 
accurate forecasts. All variables are as defined in Table 2. Independent variables are demeaned by the firm/year 
averages to reduce heteroskedasticity. T-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses. 
 
Variables (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dummy for  







Dummy for transparency (b)  0.019 
(1.38)    
(a) * (b)  -0.038 
(-1.73)    
Dummy for firm size (c)    0.030 
(2.20)   
(a) *(c)    -0.004 
(-0.17)   
Dummy for ADR firm (d)      0.025 
(1.92) 
(a)*(d)     -0.036 
(-1.64) 








































No. of obs  20,221  20,221  20,221 
Adjusted R
2 0.043  0.043  0.043 
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Table 7 Local analyst advantage and country characteristics 
This table presents ordinary least squares regression results of forecast error on local analyst dummy, analyst, firm 
and forecast characteristics, and country characteristics. Country characteristic variables include variables related to 
culture, degree of economic and financial development, degree of foreign portfolio investment, degree of investor 
protection, transparency and disclosure, and private information acquisition and communication. Dependent variable 
(Pmafep) is computed Pmafepijt=(AFEPijt-avgAFEPjT)/avgAFEPjT where AFEPijt is the absolute forecast error by 
analyst i for firm j at time t scaled by the latest available monthly stock price and avgAFEPjT is the mean absolute 
forecast error of all of the forecasts for firm j for fiscal year T. To facilitate interpretation, we multiply this variable 
by minus one, so that higher values of dependent variable imply more accurate forecasts. All country characteristic 
variables are as defined in Table 2. The regressions include the same controlling variables as in Table 5 and are not 
reported for brevity. T-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses. 
 













observations  Adj. R
2 





(-0.98)  20,221 0.043 





(-1.54)  19,741 0.038 





(-1.00)  20,221 0.043 





(-1.30)  19,175 0.043 





(1.60)  15,110 0.044 







(-1.03)  8,785 0.050 







(2.02)  20,013 0.043 





(-3.22)  16,141 0.028 





(1.14)  20,221 0.043 





(-0.10)  20,013 0.043 





(-1.52)  20,013 0.043 





(-1.15)  20,013 0.043 





(-2.36)  20,013 0.043   41













observations  Adj. R
2 







(-0.89)  19,854 0.043 







(2.97)  19,175 0.044 





(-2.72)  19,854 0.043 
(17) R





(2.41)  18,746 0.043 
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Table 8 Foreign investors and local analyst advantage 
This table presents ordinary least squares regression results of forecast error on local analyst dummy, analyst, firm 
and forecast characteristics, and foreign investment. Variables that proxy for the degree of foreign investment and 
demand for analyst services by foreign investors include (1) dummy variable that takes value 1 if a country’s U.S 
holdings of equity and debt scaled by local market GDP is greater than the median of the sample countries (US 
holdings), (2) dummy variable that takes value 1 if a country’s U.S. flow of equity and debt scaled by local market 
GDP is greater than the median of the sample countries (US flow), (3) the fraction of the equity market 
capitalization held by U.S. investors (US equity), (4) the share of a country’s equities in the portfolio of U.S. 
investors (US portfolio), (5) a country’s share in the world market portfolio (WORLD RATIO), and (6) the 
difference between a country’s share in the world market portfolio and the country’s share in the portfolio of U.S. 
investors (DIFF). Dependent variable (Pmafep) is computed Pmafepijt=(AFEPijt-avgAFEPjT)/avgAFEPjT where 
AFEPijt is the absolute forecast error by analyst i for firm j at time t scaled by the latest available monthly stock price 
and avgAFEPjT is the mean absolute forecast error of all of the forecasts for firm j for fiscal year T. To facilitate 
interpretation, we multiply this variable by minus one, so that higher values of dependent variable imply more 
accurate forecasts. All country characteristic variables are as defined in Table 2. The regressions include the same 



















observations  Adj. R
2 





(-3.49)  20,221 0.044 





(-2.38)  19,741 0.039 





(-2.77)  20,221 0.043 





(-2.07)  20,221 0.043 





(-1.53)  20,221 0.043 
(6) 
DIFF (WORLD 







(3.05)  20,221 0.044 





(-0.91)  20,221 0.044 
 DIFF    -0.011 
(-2.67) 
0.016 
(2.45)      43
Table 9 Robustness tests 
The table presents the results of robustness tests using different proxies for forecast accuracies and different samples. 
Models (1) through (3) use alternative proxies for forecast errors as dependent variables. Model (1) uses ‘pmafe’ as 
dependent variable, Model (2) ‘dafep’, and Model (3) ‘range’. All variables are defined in Table 2 and rescaled such 
that higher values indicate more accurate forecasts. Model (4) is estimated for the sample that does not impose 
restriction that a firm is followed by both local and foreign analysts. Model (5) is estimated for the sample that 
contains all the annual earnings forecasts that analysts provide for the firms they cover over 2001-2003. Model (6) 
adds additional control variables that may affect forecast accuracy. Independent variables are demeaned by the 
firm/year averages to reduce heteroskedasticity. All models are estimated with ordinary least squares regressions 
except Model (3) that uses random effect regression at the firm-level. T-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering 
are in parentheses. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 














































































Number of forecasts 
made        0.001 
(2.81) 
Number of firms 
covered        -0.002 
(-1.27) 
Number of countries 
covered        -0.006 
(-1.38) 












No.  of  obs  20,056 20,221 19,008 25,615 63,617 20,221 
Adjusted R
2  0.070 0.020 0.020 0.048 0.101 0.043 
 
 